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Night Fighting Rules

Era: WW2 · Source: Naval Wargames Society

Specialised rules for night naval engagements.

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1 Naval Night Fighting In World War II During World War II there were a number of incidents when under cover of darkness decisive victories were scored over superior forces. I must admit to a particular interest in these actions. However, few rules reflect the effect of confusion and training in such engagements. I intended to give accounts of a number of actions and then to try to identify the salient points for wargamers to consider for modifications in their rules. During research I found, perhaps not entirely surprisingly that the problems, errors and solutions were much the same for all the major participants and therefore decided to concentrate upon two lesser known actions in the channel in 1943 - 44. Operation Tunnel : 23rd October 1943 This action came about because of the Plymouth Commands efforts to intercept the blockade runner Munsterland en route from Brest to Cherbourg. The Command had other priorities, the primary one being the escort of coastal convoys, subsequently forces available were generally a few Hunt Class Destroyers, with guest appearances from Fleet Destroyers and Cruisers. This had led to the adoption of operational orders; code named Tunnel that were designed so that any ship could be issued them and take part at short notice. Essentially date, time and position were changed but little else. Thus the Germans were given the opportunity to study at close quarters the tactics employed and develop their counters. Blockade runners were difficult to catch as they generally moved at night in short hops from base to base. Their escort was always strong, consisting of a Cover Group of between four to six T-Boats and a close escort of Sperrbrecher, Minesweepers and as many coastal units that could be mustered. They were able to choose their time of sailing and were operating with experienced units. They also had the advantage of shorebased radar stations. Their objectives were quite simple in principle, contact with any enemy was to be avoided if possible. If not the Covering Force was to draw the enemy away from the convoy attacking any targets of opportunity. The convoy was to go close inshore and make for the nearest harbour. Following usual practice Plymouth Convoy Route Morlaix St Malo Cherbourg Op. Area

2 the T-Boats of the 4th TB Flotilla were concentrated at Brest to form the Cover Group while two patrol vessels and six minesweepers formed the close escort. Available at Plymouth were the cruiser Charybdis and destroyers Grenville, Rocket with three Hunts of the 15th Flotilla and one from the 1st Flotilla. Apart from the diverse composition of the force, command had devolved upon Captain Voeleker of Charybdis who had not been in command of a surface strike force before. His ship had spent the previous months escorting aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. The Senior Destroyer Officer in Limbourne had only recently joined the command and had missed most of the briefing due to other duties. Because of weather conditions and moonlight it was decided to sweep from east to west which made it likely that first contact would be with the Cover Group, but would avoid a long tail chase after the convoy. As the ships had not previously worked together it was decided that the force would operate in a single line ahead under the direction of the Senior Officer. In the event of a chase, in which Hunts were unable to keep up, they would detach and sweep to the west. No mention was made of the target vessel or that T-Boats were likely to be present in some numbers. The commanders were under the impression that this was a 'normal' patrol. The force left harbour at 19.00hrs on the 22nd October, following an uneventful passage to the patrol area the formation started the sweep to the west at 00.30hrs at a speed of 13 knots. At this stage visibility was poor to the west but was clearing eastwards behind them. They were on a reciprocal course but four miles north of the convoy route. The shore station at Ploumanach detected the formation on its approach and noted the change of course to the west, a general warning was given at approximately 00.45/23rd. Knowing the position, course and strength of the British force was not surprisingly a great bonus, thus the 4th Flotilla moved away from the convoy to the north proposing to take up position five miles north of the convoy route on a parallel course. The British force would be silhouetted against the SE horizon. The intention was then to launch a torpedo attack and retire drawing the surviving British ships with them. Talybont and Wensleydale picked up the warning and tactical orders on their interception equipment and duly passed this information to Charybdis indicating that at least five and possibly six units were in close proximity. At 01.30 Charybdis made radar contact at 14,000yds ahead. Unfortunately, she failed to pass on this contact, probably assuming that the destroyers also had it. Thus at 01.30 Charybdis had definite information on the enemy position but was probably unaware of their strength, the Hunts were aware that five or six enemy torpedo boats were close but were unaware of their position. At 01.35, Charybdis signalled the enemy’s position by now merely 8,800 yds off on a bearing of 270 degrees. Course was held with the intention of closing to 6,000 yds, at 01.38 T23 spotted the British. Three minutes later the Germans intercepted a spotting report of two destroyers at 12,000 yds. Allowing for errors in range it seemed unlikely that surprise would be achieved on either side. There was therefore enormous consternation when at 01.43 a cruiser was spotted at 2000yds virtually straight ahead with two destroyers following her. T23 made an emergency turn to starboard and launched her full complement of torpedoes.

3 Unfortunately for the British organisation broke down at this critical moment. At 01.42 a signal was made from Charybdis to turn the formation starboard and to increase speed together, unfortunately the signal was missed by all but one of the following ships. At 01.45 Charybdis opened fire with starshell, at the same time torpedo tracks were spotted, despite turning briskly to Port, at least one hit disabling the ship. In making a sharp port turn while the other ships obeyed the earlier order to turn starboard, Charybdis was placed to the port bow approximately 4000yds from the fourth in line Limbourne, who assumed she was an enemy and illuminated her with rockets. This was doubly unfortunate as it attracted more torpedoes from T22, T26 and T27 at Charybdis and Limbourne which was by this time between them and the cruiser. By this stage the British were more concerned with avoiding collision than anything else, as in attempting to conform to the leaders movements and avoiding torpedoes control had disintegrated. At 01.52 Limbourne was hit by a torpedo and shortly afterwards another hit Charybdis. The remaining British ships withdrew to the north west to reform. Some delay was experienced as the Captain of Grenville was unaware that he was now in command. The force had reformed by 03.15, after detaching two of the Hunts to pick up survivors from Charybdis and leaving one to assist the Limbourne. Rocket and Grenville swept westwards after the convoy, after failing to make contact they returned. The crew was removed from Limbourne and the ship was scuttled. The force left the area at 06.30 hours. The 4th Flotilla rejoined the convoy and successfully escorted it into Lezardrieux. Ironically Munsterland was later sunk by long range guns as she passed through the Dover Strait during the night of 20th January 1944. This action was significant for it spurred on the formation of a properly trained and equipped striking force in the channel. This was based upon the cruisers Black Prince and Bellona with the 10th Destroyer Flotilla, wh

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