All Guns Blazing — July 2011

1 All Guns Blazing! Newsletter of the Naval Wargames Society No. 207 –July 2011 EDITORIAL Well, would you believe it: I have now been editor of AGB for two years! Time flies when you‘re having fun, I suppose, but I‘ve been looking back over AGBs past and the ‗shelf-life‘ for my position seems to be around two to three years. Now, while I am more than happy to continue, I don‘t want to seem like I‘m hogging the ‗quarterdeck‘ and standing in the way of someone else desperate to seize my quill. If this is ‗you‘, drop me a line—though I should warn you it‘s a tad work than it probably appears! At the risk of seeming like some sort of NWS ‗Richard and Judy‘, I‘d like to recommend my summer read. Being a somewhat itinerant musician, I spend quite a lot often boring time behind the wheel, and for more years than I care to remember now I have rented unabridged audio books from the local library. They are great for long journeys, as having a skilled actor read you a ‗page-turner‘ really helps to eat up the miles. Over the years they have led me into reading more on naval subjects; Alexander Kent‘s Bolitho series began an interest in the age of sail and there was a Douglas Reeman about an a WWII German cruiser (The Iron Pirate, I think) that made me fall lock stock and barrel for naval wargaming over all others! My current story is by Clive Cussler, he of NUMA and Raise the Titanic fame, along with another writer, Justin Scott. This is in no way a review as I‘m only half way through it myself, but if you fancy a good thriller for the beach, with a subject that is close to our hearts, this could be the read for you! ‗The Spy‘ in question seems to be some evil genius who is hatching a plot against The Great White Fleet in 1908, and it is a bit like reading an Edwardian Tom Clancy, if you see what I mean. No nuclear reactors here, though; the thrill is the steam turbine! There are gunnery experts, fire control problems to solve and naval visionaries in the Mahan mould; oh, and I nearly forgot, some dashed pretty gals thrown in too! On Amazon, it has a four-and-a-half star rating and I‘m really enjoying it. So, if you‘re sipping pina coladas in the sun-soaked Caribbean or warm beer in the rain-soaked Cotswolds this should pass the time nicely! Well this issue is something of a ‗Stations Manned and Ready‘ special. Dave Blair‘s piece on gunnery and damage in relation to the Russo-Japanese War that appeared last month has brought a ‗reply‘ from A&A‘s Andrew Finch. It has also brought news of ‗Stationed Manned and Ready II‘, a totally revised version of the popular rule-set, and something that promises to be an exciting addition to the canon of naval wargame rules...or should that be ‗cannon‘, considering the subject? Oh, and there is an extra, highly interesting and diverting quiz this month, too, in what has proved once again to be quite a bumper AGB! ‗Up Spirits‘ everyone, and see you next month! Richard Wimpenny wimpenny@talktalk.net

2 Stations Manned and Ready First Edition Alternative Combat System Andrew Finch and Alan Butler David Blair recently submitted an interesting analysis on the combat system in the current editions (Parts I, II and III) of Stations Manned and Ready. On closer examination some of the conclusions drawn may be slightly erroneous, for reasons we would like to explain. What is important to understand is that the system is based on firing a salvo of guns from a ship to get hits on the target, and our method chooses to weight the probability of success not on the rate of fire but on the number of guns. David is correct in saying that the more guns you fire the better the chance of a hit. The actual damage done when you get a hit (which we call the IP – Impact Power) is derived from the shell weight and the rate of fire, and this value normally is fixed. In the current edition there is a table allowing for some fluctuation in the actual damage as part of a dice rolling scheme which generates the Critical Hits. While he is correct in saying that the example Russian and Japanese guns cause 3 or 2 damage respectively, the single Russian gun in his example would hit at short range on an 8+, because it gets a -2 to hit for only 1 gun, while the Japanese gun will hit on a 6+, +0 for 6 guns. The ―to hit‖ rolls use d20s – this means that the Russian would hit 65% of the time, against the Japanese hitting 75% of the time. As he says we provided an experimental alternative gunnery system which was in 2 parts. The first part revised the tables on which the ―to hit‖ scores or modifiers are based. The system uses what we call a pyramid of numbers. The original table looked correct initially but there was a mistake in the way the range of numbers was determined (Andrew holds his hand up to that error). In game terms it has no effect in that the ranges of numbers apply equally across the piece and no one is disadvantaged. When we presented the alternative combat system the revised pyramid was placed on the PDF, but (Andrew holds hand up a second time!) badly explained. The PDF has been corrected because it is misleading. What should have applied is that the brackets of numbers in the tables should have been replaced. The intention was not to replace or change anything else. The effect would have been that the Russian with 1 gun still shoots at -2 hitting on an 8+, but now the Japanese hit at -1, therefore on a 7+. This modification actually reduces the hit chances in all the tables. In his commentary on the alternate (nastier) gunnery system which allows multiple dice rolling with more guns, David is largely correct, however the existing rolls of 2D6 and use of the variable damage table should not be applied. He is correct however that if you only get 1 ―to hit‖ dice you are disadvantaged and the PDF has been adjusted now so that you roll 1d6 for the first hit, and if it comes up 6 you get a Critical Hit roll. Elsewhere in AGB you will find an article relating to SMR II, in which the critical hit system has been extensively revised, and the actual IP damage revised to take account of explosive filler in shells. The result is that the example guns swap their effectiveness – The Russian 6‖ goes down to an IP of 2 (guncotton - with a chance of a critical hit of 2 in 20), while the Japanese 6‖ gets an IP of 3 (using the better but hazardous Shimose filler - with a chance of a critical hit of 3 in 20). It has also to be said that we considered applying an iteration of the multiple ―to hit‖ dice system, but using every hit as a damaging hit. This we felt caused excessive damage. The new critical hit system mentioned elsewhere in AGB disconnects the IP from the critical effect. The numbers above are coincidentally the same. In the pre dreadnought period there are many big fat guns with a ghastly IP, due to their appalling rate of fire. By way of illustration of what lurks in the new system let us take the Italian Pre-Dreadnought Italia. The 17‖ guns in the original SMR have an IP of 1, which is down to a rate of fire of 0.07 per minute !!!. This remains in place regardless of whether the shell has Guncotton filler or Pertite – a picric acid based explosive. The critical hit chance changes significantly. It is no longer based on the chance of rolling one or more 6s, but on the actual size of the Bang. With guncotton the chance is 1 to 8 on d20 (40%) and with Pertite it is 1-11 (55%), and the 8 or 11 is the amount of damage that is applied in the critical hit tables against a tariff. This means that big shells will potentially cause lots of effects, often allowing re- rolls on the table because all the 8 or 11 must be applied.

3 Stations Manned and Ready II A work in progress from A&A Game Engineering (June 2011) Andrew Finch and Alan Butler Introduction We released the original Stations Manned and Ready in three parts over a period of two years, starting with the First World War then following this up with the Second World War split into Surface and Carrier/Air actions. As is always the case while working on the later parts we found that there were some sections that could be improved and applied one or two tweaks, which were retrofitted into Part I via downloads on our website. Over the years we have also found it necessary to make some corrections to errors in the ship data, and correct some incorrect points values. Of course, we also suffered from ―era slip‖ so data was created for the pre dreadnought era. In the end we expanded the ship data so that there are around 1300 sets provided to be downloaded from our website, and also provided three sets of scenarios covering Jutland and the Second World War in European waters and the Pacific. These scenarios can be found at www.wargamevault.com. Since we have gone over to a paperless operation, with all our products commercially available to download from Wargame Vault, the page constraints that we originally had to consider when printing have fallen away. This has given us the freedom to consolidate the rules, ironing out some inconsistencies between the WW1 and WW2 versions, and expanding the rule mechanisms. In the following article you will find many of the changes we are implementing with this project. It is based on our work plan (now in its 23rd iteration), which will soon be used to put finger to keyboard and get the new product ready for release. Fundamental Ethos The game should be easy to play rather than a detailed simulation. Vessel Types The rules have been expanded further to allow the use of smaller vessels such as MTBs, and also early torpedo boats, these vessels falling under the original lower tonnage bracket of 250 tons. Command and Crew generation We have decided to introduce an additional method of generating command and crew values, which takes nationality and period into consideration. Using this system also provides a fixed cost modifier for ships or cost for commanders, depending on which table you are using. Crew Tests The rules require crew tests to be taken for a number of reasons during the game. In the past there were various modifiers for specific tests. These are on the whole being removed, and there will be a standard set of modifiers applied in all crew tests, making the system more coherent. Game set up The system of strategic initiative has been changed considerably. Your assets can provide up to 5 different values for reconnaissance, each of which is compared with your opponent‘s. The relative values of each may provide one or 2 bonus points, which are added to your total fleet command values, and the results of a dice roll. The winner has the initiative and the loser must deploy his entire force first. In the case of a draw then fleets are deployed alternately. Bad Weather We have modified the effects of bad weather, so that it has an effect on ships‘ speed. They also provide a negative effect on gunnery, but do not block lines of sight any more. Tactical Initiative We have moved away from the system used at present and initiative is determined by rolling a d10 and adding all the on table command values for your fleet. The winner chooses who moves first, movement alternating between the forces. the winner shoots first, with one formation, then again shooting alternates. If aircraft are present, ships move, aircraft move, ships shoot, aircraft shoot.

4 Movement You can now move slowly (you have to in order to carry out damage control) which is moving at the minimum speed (= original MVR). You are as a result more vulnerable to being hit. You can make a tighter turn if you have previously moved slowly, and you can come to a halt if necessary if you moved slowly last turn. You can also now go evasive with most ships as long as they are relatively fast and don‘t have too large a turning circle. You will be more difficult to hit, but it will also be more difficult to hit your target. Damage Control Damage control has now become part of the movement segment of a turn. You have to have moved slowly to carry this out. Unlike the original rules, this does not have any effect on your shooting. Smoke Making smoke is a combat action, available to certain vessels, and requires a crew test to succeed. Smoke blocks lines of sight. Lines of sight and arcs of fire All lines of sight and ranges are measured between the nearest front corners of the ships‘ bases. Arcs of fire have been slightly altered and new arcs introduced. Some of the arcs abbreviations have been altered for consistency. The angles for determining of a target is being raked are also tested on the FRONT corner of the target nearest to the shooter. Gunnery Procedure In order that we stick to the formula that the game is intended to present a broad view of a naval action, the intention is that any weapon battery on a ship must maximise its shots at a specific target. There are situations where ―spare‖ guns may be available, but in all cases these are subject to a penalty, because the main directors will be aiming at a primary target. Gunnery Modifier and Fire Control We have introduced a Gunnery modifier, which allows a relative adjustment according to the technology available when the ship was built. This runs from –2 to +1. This represents not only the ranging mechanisms but also the method of transmitting to the guns, and it is subject to damage from Critical Hits. Ships where the fire control system is out of action must now use a different to hit number. Torpedo Combat We have completely revised the torpedo system. There are now two attacks, Spread and Salvo. The former allows attacks against multiple targets, while in the latter you attack a specified target, and if you miss you may be able to hit other vessels. On both cases the attack is controlled by a beaten zone, for which we have determined new arcs. It should be noted that we have made torpedo combat appear potentially a lot more dangerous if you are on the receiving end, with the result that players should take the appropriate action when threatened, Automatic and Light Weapons The concepts of Quick Firers and Short Range AA guns have been completely overhauled and replaced with factors (= attack dice) for Automatic Weapons and Light Weapons. These have different ranges and while both can be used against aircraft, surface vessels that may be attacked are restricted appropriately. Basic Combat Mechanism The underlying combat system is based on a ship firing the maximum number of guns at its target, the more guns firing gives a better chance of hitting, rather than greater damage. The amount of damage caused (the IP in the rules) remains unchanged (the variable IP roll has been abandoned – see the point on Critical Hits). Originally the to hit modifier ran from -2 to +2, this has now been revised so that it runs from -1 upwards. Normally the best modifier a ship will have is still +2 (because of the number of guns available). The same to hit modifier is used for numbers of aircraft attacking, and large numbers of aircraft can gain a to hit modifier of +3. It must be mentioned that this modifier is structured so that it is less cost effective to put large numbers of aircraft into one attacking element because you get fewer attack dice ―per aircraft‖ hence fewer hits, though the element will take longer to eliminate due to the numbers of aircraft – it is up to the player to make that choice.

5 Other combat modifiers have been reviewed and we have introduced modifiers for having damaged steering and moving slow (which is required for certain game operations). Critical Hits These are what the players are after in a game. The original system provided for critical hits to occur as part of the variable damage roll, so you could get one or more such effects depending on dice rolls. One thing that emerged also from working backwards to the pre-dreadnought era was that you may have a large gun, but because of its dreadful rate of fire the basic damage was execrable. We have introduced a new method of determining whether the hit causes a critical hit, which is based on the Critical Value (CV) of the weapon concerned. This works on the principle of the bigger the bang the bigger the CV. Success is tested by rolling a D20 and scoring equal to or less than the CV. When successful you roll on a revised critical hit table, depending on the ship hit. In most cases you expend points of CV to knock out bits of the target, in a similar fashion to the original system, though there are now some further refinements to the effects, which add a bit of flavour. There are still opportunities for magazine explosions, though the system for this has been revised, explained separately. Loss of Main weapons (Guns) The loss of the main gun weapons remains a significant part of the Critical hit table. We are however refining the way the guns are lost, and that chance of hitting the main guns or other guns will better reflect the proportion of the different guns on the ship and how they are mounted. We have yet to finalise how the hit distribution will be managed. The options are to make it fairly generic (allowing for one or two significant exceptions where the proportion varies widely from the norm), to make it ship specific, or some balance of both. Magazine Safety In the previous rules we adopted a long standing view that some vessels were more vulnerable than others, mainly for anecdotal reasons (British Battlecruisers at Jutland being the obvious case). If you study the situation in more detail ships were lost for various reasons, in this case due to a desire to increase the rate of fire leading to slovenly procedures in the handing rooms. We therefore made a conscious decision to handle this effect differently, and in various ways. Firstly, we have considered the type of explosives being used, which range from Guncotton for the very early period, via Picric Acid based materiel in the early 20th C, up to more stable TNT by WW2. This has added a rather interesting variety between navies. If ships are carrying Picric Acid derivatives then the vessel is deemed to be a bit more vulnerable to magazine explosions (-1 penalty on the test) due to the instability of the ammunition. This is balanced by a cost reduction for the ship, and also the availability of some special optional rules: for instance if you are British using Lyddite shells there is a chance that you can opt to go for a considerably bigger ―bang‖ when testing for critical hits, but this balanced by the fact that the shell may not actually penetrate any armour at all. If you are feeling very courageous you can use the Beatty rule, which increases the IP damage caused on the target, however if you suffer a main turret hit your magazine tests are made at an additional -1 penalty. Finally the US and German navies get a +1 bonus on their tests due to better ammunition storage systems from the early 1920s onwards. Fire In the original rules we decided that we would not have ongoing fire (or flood) damage because of the requirements for bookkeeping. On the other hand, as part of the revised Critical Hit system, we are now allowing for fires to be started, which will have a deleterious effect on the effectiveness of a crew, so much so that in the end they will be unable to fight fires and are likely to fail their morale tests. It will be essential that fires be brought under control as soon as possible. Loss of Ships We reviewed what the actual effect should be when a ship runs out of structure and flotation. In the end we have decided that under most circumstances a ship will stay afloat as a wreck, getting in the way, unless it is destroyed as a specific effect in the critical hit table. On the other hand, it is also permissible to try to sink a wreck (which may be necessary in some circumstances). Night The combat system for night time has been revised, providing modifiers for shooting guns and torpedoes, and the rules for the use of searchlights and starshell have been improved.

6 Morale Victory and Defeat rests largely on failure of morale of the enemy. The order of morale tests has been revised so that the tests are done for ships, squadrons then fleets, so a failure can quickly cascade through the force. Ship data As part of the work, the ship data will; be updated and revised. This means a considerable refinement in the amount of data which will be presented for any given ship class, but also an expansion in the actual number of data sets that will be available. We are considering the best way of presenting the information. ROSKILL AND ‗THE TIMES‘ By Mike Dowd Serendipity or coincidence (and I don‘t mean range finders!) is a weird thing,I had at last got around to undertaking the task of reading Roskill‘s ‗The War At Sea‘, the official cabinet office commissioned naval history of the Second World War. (published in several HMSO volumes between 1954- 1961 as I am sure many AGB readers both know and have their own well thumbed copies of) As someone who‘s interests are primarily in the dreadnought and pre-dreadnought era, I obtained these books mainly because I was fortunate enough to purchase a nearly complete set ( minus part 1 of Vol III) of original first editions at a library sale a couple of years ago for the princely sum of £1 each(!) The thick tomes had sat quietly waiting ever since, for me to take up the daunting challenge of trying to study and comprehend this several thousand page epic sweep of history ever since. Anyhow, the prompting of the unseasonably warm dry April weather saw me ‗finding time‘ and therefore just a couple of weeks ago I was in the garden stretched on the sun lounger and galloping through the last dozen or so pages of Volume I, where it is now December 1941 just days after the attack on Pearl Harbour and the fall of Singapore is imminent. I read on, gripped at the description of HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales stoically fighting their last unsupported actions against the overwhelming Japanese torpedo bomber air strikes before Repulse first succumbs and then Prince of Wales goes down taking Captain John Leach and force commander Admiral Phillips with her. Roskill concludes, ‗The year closed with unbroken storm clouds hanging on the eastern horizon‘. As my horizon was still cloudless and hot I retired indoors in search for a cooling libation, after such an exciting conclusion. Inside I notice that day‘s copy of The Times lying unopened. Ignoring the usual headlines of doom and gloom, I chance upon opening it at the (still excellent) obituary pages, only to see… ‗Admiral Henry Leach 1923-2011‘….to say the least a rather uncanny and eerie feeling crept over me. Former First Sea Lord, Chief of Naval Staff and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Conyers Leach, who died aged 87 at the end of April this year was best remembered in for his part in persuading the British Government that we could succeed with a Naval operation to re take the Falklands Islands in 1982. Recently characterised by the journalist Andrew Marr in his television documentary series ‗History of Modern Britain‘ as, ―Thatcher‘s Knight in Shining Gold Braid.‖ It was Leach, who, on reading the negative briefings by the MOD that were casting doubt on how, why, or if we should do anything about the situation in the South Atlantic prompted Leach, dressed in full uniform and his blood well land truly up, to march in to Parliament in pursuit of the evasive Secretary for Defence John Nott with whom he had crossed swords many times over recent defence cuts. Leach ended up having to be taken in to a room where an emergency meeting was being attended by the Prime Minister (he was never ‗summoned‘ as was later portrayed in various personal memoirs, biographies and TV/Film adaptations). When asked if the islands really could be retaken he famously announced ‗We must!‘ Following which, the Prime Minister asked..why? he stiffened and exclaimed ―Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country who‘s word counts for little!‖. His life was also covered in Radio 4‘s ‗The Last Word‘ obituary programme (broadcast 5th May 2011) where he was described by his former nemesis Sir John Nott as ―a truly Nelsonian Admiral, in the best naval tradition of sailing straight at the enemy….trouble was, he kept sailing straight at me!‖ As First Lord in 1979 he handled the very difficult defence ‗spending reviews‘ (ie:- big cuts), which he felt and knew were against his better judgement, but ultimately something he had to sell to the Navy if it were to survive in some form he was prepared to recognise. He was infamously and unprecedently booed by a full meeting of his 60 Admirals when he was forced to uphold the Government line that the Trident

7 missile system was more important than the wider Navy itself, and who‘s cost would not fall across all three services but on the RN budget alone. Falklands Task Force Commander Admiral Sir John Forster ‗Sandy‘ Woodward described him as decent, competent, honest and straight talking, a man who on his (Woodward‘s) accession to the rank of Captain in 1972 was set a task by Leach of describing ‗ Why this country needs a Navy‘ …..on no more than 1 side of foolscap. (If only we carried this spirit and simple clarity of vision and purpose in today‘s similar circumstances.) Whilst the Falkland decision was the biggest of his life, for which he has never really received the recognition he deserved (politicians see to things like that) his actions and single mindedness in making it succeed somewhat ‗saved‘ the modern Navy, but Leach‘s earlier exploits were nonetheless filled with huge adventure and professionalism, which not least of which included commanding the gun room of ‗A‘ Turret on the Duke of York during the sinking of the Scharnhorst at the battle of the North Cape in December 1943. However, most poignantly, is that having just finished reading the ‗official version‘ of his father Captain John Leach‘s demise, though Roskill does not mention it at the time, Henry Leach himself was also present in Singapore in December 1941 as a young midshipman assigned to a plotting room (as his own vessel HMS Mauritius was in for re fit), and where after hearing the terrible news of the action he joined the forlorn search for survivors his own father with whom he had enjoyed a couple of ‗Gin slings‘ only two nights before, sadly not being amongst them. As I replaced Vol I and prepared to open Vol II, I realised that more than simply a strange and singular conclusion had occurred; an uncanny happenstance whose deeper connections I had hitherto been unaware of, had passed across the pages, and in to Naval history. Serendipity or coincidence (and I don‘t mean range finders!) is a weird thing,I had at last got around to undertaking the task of reading Roskill‘s ‗The War At Sea‘, the official cabinet office commissioned naval history of the Second World War. (published in several HMSO volumes between 1954- 1961 as I am sure many AGB readers both know and have their own well thumbed copies of) As someone who‘s interests are primarily in the dreadnought and pre-dreadnought era, I obtained these books mainly because I was fortunate enough to purchase a nearly complete set ( minus part 1 of Vol III) of original first editions at a library sale a couple of years ago for the princely sum of £1 each(!) The thick tomes had sat quietly waiting ever since, for me to take up the daunting challenge of trying to study and comprehend this several thousand page epic sweep of history ever since. Anyhow, the prompting of the unseasonably warm dry April weather saw me ‗finding time‘ and therefore just a couple of weeks ago I was in the garden stretched on the sun lounger and galloping through the last dozen or so pages of Volume I, where it is now December 1941 just days after the attack on Pearl Harbour and the fall of Singapore is imminent. I read on, gripped at the description of HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales stoically fighting their last unsupported actions against the overwhelming Japanese torpedo bomber air strikes before Repulse first succumbs and then Prince of Wales goes down taking Captain John Leach and force commander Admiral Phillips with her. Roskill concludes, ‗The year closed with unbroken storm clouds hanging on the eastern horizon‘. As my horizon was still cloudless and hot I retired indoors in search for a cooling libation, after such an exciting conclusion. Inside I notice that day‘s copy of The Times lying unopened. Ignoring the usual headlines of doom and gloom, I chance upon opening it at the (still excellent) obituary pages, only to see… ‗Admiral Henry Leach 1923-2011‘….to say the least a rather uncanny and eerie feeling crept over me. Former First Sea Lord, Chief of Naval Staff and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Conyers Leach, who died aged 87 at the end of April this year was best remembered in for his part in persuading the British Government that we could succeed with a Naval operation to re take the Falklands Islands in 1982. Recently characterised by the journalist Andrew Marr in his television documentary series ‗History of Modern Britain‘ as, ―Thatcher‘s Knight in Shining Gold Braid.‖ It was Leach, who, on reading the negative briefings by the MOD that were casting doubt on how, why, or if we should do anything about the situation in the South Atlantic prompted Leach, dressed in full uniform and his blood well land truly up, to march in to Parliament in pursuit of the evasive Secretary for Defence John Nott with whom he had crossed swords many times over recent defence cuts. Leach ended up having to be taken in to a room where an emergency meeting was being attended by the Prime Minister (he was never ‗summoned‘ as was later portrayed in various personal memoirs, biographies and TV/Film adaptations). When asked if the islands really could be retaken he famously announced ‗We must!‘ Following which, the Prime Minister asked..why? he stiffened and exclaimed ―Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in

8 our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country who‘s word counts for little!‖. His life was also covered in Radio 4‘s ‗The Last Word‘ obituary programme (broadcast 5th May 2011) where he was described by his former nemesis Sir John Nott as ―a truly Nelsonian Admiral, in the best naval tradition of sailing straight at the enemy….trouble was, he kept sailing straight at me!‖ As First Lord in 1979 he handled the very difficult defence ‗spending reviews‘ (ie:- big cuts), which he felt and knew were against his better judgement, but ultimately something he had to sell to the Navy if it were to survive in some form he was prepared to recognise. He was infamously and unprecedently booed by a full meeting of his 60 Admirals when he was forced to uphold the Government line that the Trident missile system was more important than the wider Navy itself, and who‘s cost would not fall across all three services but on the RN budget alone. Falklands Task Force Commander Admiral Sir John Forster ‗Sandy‘ Woodward described him as decent, competent, honest and straight talking, a man who on his (Woodward‘s) accession to the rank of Captain in 1972 was set a task by Leach of describing ‗ Why this country needs a Navy‘ …..on no more than 1 side of foolscap. (If only we carried this spirit and simple clarity of vision and purpose in today‘s similar circumstances.) Whilst the Falkland decision was the biggest of his life, for which he has never really received the recognition he deserved (politicians see to things like that) his actions and single mindedness in making it succeed somewhat ‗saved‘ the modern Navy, but Leach‘s earlier exploits were nonetheless filled with huge adventure and professionalism, which not least of which included commanding the gun room of ‗A‘ Turret on the Duke of York during the sinking of the Scharnhorst at the battle of the North Cape in December 1943. However, most poignantly, is that having just finished reading the ‗official version‘ of his father Captain John Leach‘s demise, though Roskill does not mention it at the time, Henry Leach himself was also present in Singapore in December 1941 as a young midshipman assigned to a plotting room (as his own vessel HMS Mauritius was in for re fit), and where after hearing the terrible news of the action he joined the forlorn search for survivors his own father with whom he had enjoyed a couple of ‗Gin slings‘ only two nights before, sadly not being amongst them. As I replaced Vol I and prepared to open Vol II, I realised that more than simply a strange and singular conclusion had occurred; an uncanny happenstance whose deeper connections I had hitherto been unaware of, had passed across the pages, and in to naval history. OPEN BOOK PEARL HARBOR QUIZ (I am indebted to naval wargamer Brandon Musler for allowing me to include this interesting, and witty, Pearl Harbour quiz in AGB. Oh, and in deference to Brandon, I have kept the US style dates and spellings. Thanks again, Brandon! RW) (This is a legitimate quiz but ‗F‘ is the default ‗Hollywood answer‘ for those who'd rather gag than guess.) 1. Most likely Arizona was sunk by… A) A bomb that went down her funnel and set off a chain reaction in her boilers B) Hot gasses from an exploding bomb that went through a hatch left open for inspection C) A bomb that penetrated her deck and exploded in the forward magazine D) A torpedo from a Japanese midget submarine E) All of the above F) A well meaning able seaman armed with a .50 Caliber gun, positioned on the next ship in battleship row and shooting with happy disregard at the Japanese aircraft that flies between his ship and the Arizona. (Disney's Pearl Harbor) 2. Which aircraft got the best results relative to Japanese expectations on 12/7/41? A) The B5N Kate performing as a torpedo bomber

9 B) The B5N Kate performing as a level bomber C) The D3A Val D) The A6M Zero E) The P-40B F) Any plane flown by a Japanese pilot who dons a white rising sun headband and drinks a cup of sake before takeoff (Disney's Pearl Harbor) 3. The Japanese aircrew which struck Pearl Harbor are generally best characterized as: A) Mostly battle tested veterans who had seen a great deal of fighting in China. B) Those pilots with the most flight time in the Imperial Japanese Navy C) A mix of aviators with experienced leaders and freshly qualified "nuggets." D) Highly trained specialists with both their aircraft and weapons. E) A mix of Army and Navy pilots brought together and cross trained. F) Extras 4. From the strategic perspective the attack on Pearl Harbor was… A) An unnecessary provocation due to logistical considerations B) Considered essential by the Naval General Staff to protecting Japan's flank during it drive to secure resources in south Asia. C) Primarily intended by Yamamoto to break America's will to fight and bring it to the negotiating table. D) All of the above E) None of the above F) "If we must, we can raise havoc with them for a year... after that, I can guarantee nothing" (Actor Sô Yamamura needlessly misquoting Admiral Yamamoto – Source: Tora !Tora! Tora!) 5. From Yamamoto's perspective the primary target of the attack at Pearl Harbor was… A) Aircraft carriers B) Battleships C) Aircraft and airfields D) Harbor and dock facilities E) Tankers and fuel oil storage tanks F) United States Navy ships laid down after 1950 (Tora! Tora! Tora!) 6. The weapon system which worked best on 12/7/41 for the Japanese was… A) The Type 91 Mod 2 torpedo delivered by the B5N Kate B) The Type 99 #80 800kg Armored Piercing bomb built from 16" gun shells. C) The Type 99 #25 250kg General Purpose bomb delivered by the D3A Val D) The Type 97 torpedo delivered by Japanese midget submarines E) The command radios installed in flight leaders' aircraft F) The infamous Anti-runway Torpedo (Disney's Pearl Harbor) 7. During training B5N Kate crews scored with 82.5% accuracy. How many torpedo hits did the 40 Kates that attacked on 12/7/41 score on primary targets (of any sort?) A) 33 B) 27 C) 22 D) 19 E) 15 F) Kate Winslet, Blanchett, Hudson, Beckinsale, Mara or Kapshaw? Laden or unladen? 8. Which ship sinking would a typical American battleship officer probably have found most worrisome in the wake of the attack in 1941?

10 A) UTAH B) OKLAHOMA and WEST VIRGINIA C) NEVADA and CALIFORINIA, or ARIZONA D) All of the above because the Japanese were not considered capable E) None of the above because it was a surprise attack F) Any DE with a Hull number in the 1000's 9. Nagumo's decision not to launch a third wave strike can best be characterized as… A) Another example of his inability to properly balance risk vs. reward B) Consistent with the Japanese plan of attack C) Not in keeping with Yamamoto's operational plan D) Directly at odds with fervent, repeated recommendations made by Fuchida and Genda after they returned from their sorties E) A blunder that might have forced the US Pacific fleet to retreat to America's West Coast for repairs and replenishment. F) Quite fortunate for future film producers… 10. Yamamoto considered that the attack on Pearl Harbor should be averted under which circumstances or conditions? A) If Japanese scout planes or submarines were discovered before the attack B) If the Japanese task force was spotted at sea inside 24 hours before the attack by American reconnaissance C) If American carriers were discovered to be absent from Pearl Harbor D) If `battleship row' was protected by torpedo netting and barrage balloons E) None of the above F) Should Romantic subplots appear… Sources: Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions, by Alan Zimm. Tora! Tora! Tora! Goofs: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0066473/goofs Pearl Harbor Goofs: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0213149/goofs --------------- BONUS QUESTION: The attack by 14-18 D3A Val dive bombers which scored 5 hits on Nevada as she entered the channel… --------------- G) Was the decision of Lt. Cmdr. Egusa but in keeping with Fuchida's briefing and Genda's approval to seek opportunities to "bottle up" the American fleet. H) Was an inappropriate weapon-target match which would have required at least ten times more 250kg bomb hits to sink the battleship in the channel I) Was futile because sinking NEVADA could not block the main channel even temporarily J) All of the above K) None of the above L) Sorry but there is no letter F in the bonus… Answer Key: [ 1-C, 2-D, 3-C, 4-A, 5-B, 6-A, 7-E, 8-C, 9-B, 10-E Bonus-J]

11 The Crimean War at Sea: The Naval Campaigns Against Russia 1854-56 By Peter Duckers Published by Pen & Sword Maritime RRP £19.99 Reviewed by Simon Stokes If like me your knowledge of the naval aspects of the Crimean war is rather scant, I promise this book will be a revelation to you. If on the other hand your knowledge is more expansive you will instead revel in the detail that this book offers. First off the title of this book, as Mr Duckers comments himself in the foreword, is a little misleading since from the outset of the war with Russia the Allies instituted a policy of harassing Russia and her economic trade wherever and whenever they were able. After outlining the background to the war with Russia and describing the opposing fleets, the book then divides into several discreet chapters describing the naval campaigns in the Baltic, the White Sea, the Pacific and of course in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff. He also covers the actions of the naval brigade during the land campaign in the Crimea. Mr Duckers writing style is clear and accessible, and his opinions measured and backed up with supporting facts. There is also a smattering of quotations from contemporary first hand accounts, including from the then midshipman George Tryon. Make no mistake, there is no stirring Trafalgaresque fleet engagement to describe here, though as the author points out there was very real potential for this, and indeed expectation from the British public. Rather there are a series of coastal bombardments, blockade and small ship actions as the allies attempt to winkle out elements of the Russian fleet from their often heavily fortified naval bases. You do however get a real sense of the problems facing the commanders and the reasoning involved in fighting a naval campaign during the era of transition from sail to steam and the kind of re-adjustments and extemporisations the commanders on the spot had to make. The treasure trove for the naval history buff comes in the appendices and notes which run to a full 58 pages, and contain, amongst other things, lists of all the ships on both sides in each theatre that detail the ship designation, number of guns and the captain, figures for the naval brigade losses during the land campaign, a list of the Victoria crosses won during the campaign and a copy of Sir Charles Napier‘s defence of his conduct of the naval campaign in the Baltic in 1854. All in all, thoroughly recommended. Simon Stokes

12 A VISION OF THE FUTURE (Many Thanks to Clive Essery for passing on this all-too-worrying, but no less hilarious, look at the ‗future‘!) It's 2038. HMS Indefensible has been handed over to the Royal Navy... (Love the ensign! RW) Today in a grand ceremony at Portsmouth dockyard HMS Indefensible was commissioned into the Royal Navy. Described as the most stealthy warship in the world, she is now the only vessel in the Royal Navy and replaces 2 mothballed aircraft carriers, 6 destroyers and 4 submarines. Responding to criticism about the shrinking fleet, the MoD replied "It's not about numbers, it's about quality not quantity. HMS Indefensible represents a revolution in naval procurement, stealthy, light and agile she will provide a highly flexible platform. She is invisible to radar and almost immune to torpedo or missile attack. Her shallow draft makes her ideal for work in the littoral (coastal) areas. She is also highly efficient with virtually zero carbon emissions and zero fuel consumption" Admiral Sir James Bland added "She is ready to respond instantly to events and can be deployed to trouble spots anywhere in the world. The RAF have promised to fly her to wherever she's needed provided (1)They are not busy (2)The weather is OK (3)There is a large airfield provided by a friendly foreign nation close by". Constructed by Britain 's only ship builder BVATe Systems in Birmingham , taking 8 years to build, and costing just £1.5 Billion she is a triumph of British engineering. Her forward section was built in China in 2 weeks and then shipped to the UK . The forward section was then joined to the stern built in Birmingham and the complex technical systems installed. However the programme was not all plain sailing and has not been without its problems "The original design included an outboard motor but early in the building process the Treasury insisted cost savings had to be made so out went the motor. After some time spent on computer-modelling and research we selected oars" said a BVATe spokesperson. Although £1.2 Billion over-budget and 3 years late, Secretary of State for Defence, William Bragg says we can all be proud "The Type 48 programme has sustained 10,000 British manufacturing jobs in addition to 30,000 civil servants in the MoD project team. She will represent the leading edge of British manufacturing wherever she goes and is worth every penny" Bragg also says he is hoping to see export orders soon although as yet there has been little interest. Some observers have commented that her lack of any armament could be a problem but the MoD answered robustly "The Foreign Office advised us that carrying weapons can be seen as provocative and that actually firing a weapon at someone would definitely infringe their human rights. We considered

13 this advice at an early stage in the design process and together with the fabulous cost-savings, the case for having no armament was overwhelming". Her commanding officer, Commander Rupert Tubworthy-Pollock said "To be selected from the 1,200 officers still serving in the RN for the only seagoing command available is a great privilege. Bringing her out of build and into commission has been a huge challenge but I'm confident she will prove to be a great asset". With a crew of just 2, she is a fine example of lean-manning, reducing running costs and lessening the RN's recruitment headaches. Her crew, AB "soapy" Watson said "On my last ship I had to share the mess with 40 other men but on the new Type 48 sharing is far a less of a problem. As I'm now the only rating in the Royal Navy I have a lot of responsibility". HMS Indefensible is expected to complete sea trials shortly, go to Plymouth for Operational Sea Training, have a short refit in Rosyth and then and be deployed as part of the new Euro-Navy task force. Battle on the Seven Seas: German Cruiser Battles 1914 – 1918 Published by Pen & Sword Maritime By Gary Staff Reviewed by David Manley History is written by the victors, or so they say, and this is as true in the maritime as it is for other aspects of warfare. Gary Staff seeks to redress the balance in this book, which covers WW1 cruiser warfare from a uniquely German perspective. Drawing on first-hand accounts and extensive research in the Bundesarchiv , and supported by an extensive selection of photographs (many previously unpublished), Mr Staff presents an excellent description of German cruisers at war across the globe. Some of the actions will be well known to those interested in WW1 naval battles; the Falklands, Coronel, Jutland, Dogger Bank, Heligoland Bight for example. Whilst these are well covered here and elsewhere the real interest (from my perspective at least) is in the descriptions of the less well known battles, those in the Baltic, Black Sea and Aegean in particular. Mr Staff‘s writing style is clear and engaging; this book is a ―good read‖. I suspect there is some carry-over of style from the original German reports since on occasion the unit of measurement for range is ―hm‖ (hundreds of metres), so for example we read of engagements at 78hm. Each action is accompanied by at least one track chart. These are generally good, although the chart for Heligoland Bight is fairly cluttered (by virtue of the scale of the action) and could perhaps have been better represented by 2 or 3 sub-charts. He is also prone to drawing some interesting conclusions – for example it is claimed that Cape Sarych proves the cliché that dreadnought battleships made pre-dreadnoughts obsolete is ―blatantly incorrect‖ (despite reminding the reader that the official German history lamented the poor gunnery performance and expected Yavuz to have dealt the Russian force a deadly blow). But these are minor points and are not themselves as blatant as some of Mr. Staffs hero worship as exhibited in some of his earlier works for osprey. This is, in my view, one of the most interesting books on WW1 naval warfare for a long while and should be a welcome addition to the library of anyone interested in the period. (My thanks to David for reviewing properly a book I merely alerted everyone to last month in Signal Pad. RW)

14 NAVY LEAGUE QUIZ PART ELEVEN Well here we are again, gents, with Rob Morgan‘s engaging quiz; beginning as usual with the last month‘s answers. If you recall last month‘s quiz, I thought I‘d got question five, but was perplexed by the 1881 date, when the earliest to my reckoning, Tryon, was lost in 1893; perhaps it was just a red herring? ‗The Navy league‘ employed a cunning bunch! 1. With which naval action do you associate Sir Beachamp Seymour? The bombardment of Algiers in 1883. 2. Which three RN armoured ships were brig-rigged? HMS ‘Temeraire’ (1877), HMS’ Inflexible’ (1881) and HMS ‘Imperieuse’ (1886). 3. Was the Santissima Trinidad a four-decker line-of-battle ship at Trafalgar? If not, why not? (There was something of a debate amongst the Navy League‘s august membership over this one! The final answer was given as this...and do disagree, if you want to.) No. She had four tiers of guns, but the uppermost was not decked over. (Hmm???) 4. To which navy does Shropshire belong? (this is 1952, remember!) The Royal Australian Navy. 5. Name the six RN flag officers lost with their flagships between 1881 and 1941. The six given are: Tryon, HMS ‘Victoria’; Cradock, HMS ‘Good Hope’; Hood, HMS ‘Invincible’; Arbuthnot, HMS ‘Defence’; Holland, HMS ‘Hood’; and Phillips, HMS ‘Prince of Wales’. So, on with Part Eleven itself. Rob writes: Here we are, gentlemen, another one to venture over the long hot weekends, should we have any this year! By the way, it is worth mentioning that many of the original questions were two-string, even three or four, and sometimes one part is, to say the least, obscure. Number 3 below is an example. So sometimes, gentlemen, you get the easy bits! 1. Name five Royal Navy warships named after titles (not individuals) in British Royalty. 2. Name the first Royal Navy warship to carry her armament in two turrets. 3. Which warship involved at Ylo in 1877 was described by the original Sea Quiz compiler as a ‗pirate turret ship‘? 4. Which British aircraft carrier was laid down as a Chilean battleship? The original quiz required both names and the year of her sinking. 5. HMS Whitely, a W-Class destroyer, sunk in 1940 owed her name to what? Good luck, chaps. I‘m sure Rob will come up trumps once again next month! SIGNAL PAD!

15 A Crimean Puzzle Solved This ‗thread‘ of emails was doing the rounds recently among some of our members, and as at it was rather interesting, I have been given permission to include it in our very own ‗Signal Pad‘. It also ties in with Simon‘s review of his newly-purchased Crimean War book found above! Jeff Crane got the ball rolling... While watching an episode of 'Bargain Hunt' today, one of the items up for auction purported to be a little wooden box made from the deck beams of HMS Arethusa, the 'last ship to sail into battle'. However, search as I may I can't find any reference to this on the web. She 'seems' to have taken part in the bombardment of Sebastopol but I'm not sure of this incident. Anyway, I would have thought that that accolade should apply to the See Adler during WWI. Any thoughts? ...Simon Stokes replied... Referring to my latest purchase of naval literature "Crimean War at Sea" by Peter Duckers, I can confirm that Arethusa was a 50 gun sail powered warship which was part of the British fleet in the Black Sea during the Crimean War and she was involved, together with Tiger, Retribution, Sampson, Terrible, Furious, Highflyer and Sans Pareil plus the French ships Mogador, Vauban, Descartes and Caton in the bombardment of Odessa on 22nd April 1854. There is however no mention of this being the last time that a major British warship sailed into action, though it might well have been since Arethusa was the last British ship to disengage from the bombardment. The distinction, if true, is a little mute however since later that year many British sailing ships of the line took part in the much larger bombardment of Sebastopol; only on that occasion the sailing ships were each tethered to a steam ship which manoeuvred them into position in the constrained waters of the approaches to the Sebastopol defensive forts. ...then Rob Morgan added... I work extensively with Ukrainian academic organisations, and am a friend of Petr Klishevsky formerly Director of the Museum of the Navy at Odessa, which is a superb place. In that city on the promenade there is mounted a cannon taken from Tiger at the bombardment, where she was a casualty. I saw it in 1993, I think it is a 24pdr, but didn't have my camera (sod’s law) and the promised photo never emerged. There is said to be a small RN graveyard there too, but I didn't get to see that. ...before Simon concluded... Thanks for that additional nugget, Rob. Duckers covers the loss of the Tiger in his book too. Tiger was a 17-gun paddle steamer and she was actually lost on 12th May some days after the bombardment at which Arethusa was present. She approached too close to the coast off Odessa and ran aground on rocks under high cliffs. She became stuck fast and, as the fog lifted, was a sitting target for the Russian gunners, but exchanged fire with them anyway. She surrendered only after her captain (Henry Giffard) was mortally wounded. Duckers doesn't state how many of her crew died but confirms that 225 members of her crew were taken prisoner and that the Russians did indeed remove some of her guns. Duckers doesn't confirm if they were 24pdrs but it would seem reasonable that they were. The ship herself was beyond salvage and was burned. Apparently this was all played out under the gaze of a large number of locals who lined the cliffs to watch events unfold. All highly interesting stuff, I‘m sure you agree, and it makes splendid reading in ‗Signal Pad‘. I was lucky to spot this exchange, but there must be many more out there I don‘t pick up—so send them in! (RW) Society Profile

16 In one of the other 'historical' wargames and research societies of which I'm a member, and for which I write, it is actively being discussed whether to provide a promotional article (in this case jointly with a group of re-enactors). The BBC History magazine, published monthly is now carrying on a regular basis adverts for 'Airfix' military and naval products, as well as those of 'King& Country', the 54mm manufacturers. If there is considered sufficient response for 'Airfix' in particular to advertise, then there's surely sufficient interest for a Society such as ours to put together a wargame on a specific battle...Jutland, River Plate, North Cape, Coronel, Trafalgar, the Armada campaign, or whatever. If we could do this, with some decent photographs it would clearly raise our profile. Rob Morgan. (Perhaps Jutland using A&A Games new SMR II as outlined above? Whoops, what have I started? RW) DM Views: On HMS Carloline [This is in reference to Mike Dowd’s article on the old girl’s demise RW] – the Project Team that is responsible for the ship is based in Abbey Wood, the same MOD office complex in which I‘m working. I‘ll get on to some of my colleagues there to see if they can shed any light on what is happening. If anyone knows it should be them! On the Cod Wars [See last month’s ‘Signal Pad’ entry by Rob Morgan RW] – Rob‘s memory regarding the series in Military Modelling is spot on. However, more recently there was a set of rules written (by yours truly) covering the Cod Wars which was published in Battlefleet and (IIRC) Miniature Wargames a few years back. We also used them as the basis for a participation game that I ran at several shows including Flagship and events at the Royal Navy Museum in Portsmouth. And in more recent times, I adapted the rules to cover the duels between Japanese whaling fleets and Greenpeace in the Southern Oceans. The Cod War article has been preserved for posterity on the NWS website in the ―scenarios‖ page - http://www.navalwargamessociety.org/scenarios/Cod_War.pdf All being well the Cod War game is one of the games that I‘m going to be taking along to the naval Wargames event in Gosport on the August Bank Holiday. Talking of which... Some of you will have received the ―warning order‖ a couple of AGBs ago, but here it is once again: The Naval Wargames Society and the Explosion Museum of Naval Firepower are holding a weekend of naval wargaming at the museum in Gosport over the weekend of the August Bank Holiday, 27th – 28th 2011. Plenty of space and tables are available and there should be room for upwards of ten tables available of varying sizes. There is also a large outdoor area where it is hoped a WW2 surface action will be played out using 1/600 models and a 1/600 ―ground scale‖ for some of the weekend. Space is available in the museum grounds for camping over the weekend. Admission to the museum for the weekend will be free for those running games. The aim of the event is to provide a forum where naval (and other) gamers can come together to run and/or play in each others‘ games. Games can be as long or as short as you like, and the intention is to include a few participation games so that members of the public can join in too. The emphasis is on gaming and there is no formal trade element (not this year at least). However, if there are any traders who would like to attend they would be more than welcome – please contact Nick Hewitt for details of arrangements. For more details, or to book a table for a game for all or part of the weekend please contact Nick Hewitt nh "at" pnbpt "dot" co "dot" uk or me, David Manley. Contact details for the Explosion Museum are as follows: Explosion! Museum of Naval Firepower Heritage Way Priddy's Hard Gosport Hampshire PO12 4LE United Kingdom

17 JOINING THE NAVAL WARGAMES SOCIETY If you have been lent this newsletter and would like to join the Naval Wargames Society, please follow this link to join our Society: www.navalwargamessociety.org. NWS Events and Regional Contacts, 2009 NWS Northern Fleet – Falkirk East Central Scotland Kenny Thomson, 1 Excise Lane, Kincardine, Fife, FK10 4LW, Tel: 01259 731091 e-mail: kenny.thomson@homecall.co.uk - Website: http://falkirkwargamesclub.org.uk/ Falkirk Wargames Club meets each Monday night at 7pm with a variety of games running each evening. Naval games are popular with 2 or 3 run each month. Campaign games sometimes feature in our monthly weekend sessions. Games tend to be organised week to week making a 3-month forecast here a waste of time. Please get in touch if you‘d like to come along.  Popular periods – Modern (Shipwreck), WW1 and 2 (GQ), WW2 Coastal (Action Stations), and Pre-dreadnought (P Dunn‘s rules) NWS North Hants [Every 3rd Sunday] Jeff Crane 31 Park Gardens, Black Dam, Basingstoke, Hants, 01256 427906 e-mail: gf.crane@ntlworld.com NWS Wessex [Bi-Monthly Meetings] The Wessex Group has gone into (hopefully) temporary abeyance for the moment. If anyone living in the Bath / Bristol / Gloucester area (or further afield) would like to take on managing the group please contact myself or any of the other NWS officials.